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CRIMINAL LAW
APPRENDI IN THE STATES: THE VIRTUES
OF FEDERALISM AS A STRUCTURAL
LIMIT ON ERRORS
STEPHANOS BIBAS*
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that any fact
(except recidivism) that increases a defendant's statutory maximum
sentence must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.' This federal
constitutional ruling disrupted not only the federal courts, but also the far
larger number of criminal cases handled in state courts. In addition, state
courts are free not only to interpret Apprendi, but to find broader Apprendi-
type rights under their own state constitutions. Thus, one might have
expected Apprendi to unleash a variety of creative interpretations in state
court, many of which could have gone beyond the federal constitutional
minimum.
The big surprise of the last three years is that there is no surprise.
State courts have by and large interpreted Apprendi very cautiously and
narrowly. Only in select areas have a few courts interpreted their own
constitutions more broadly than the Federal Constitution. Evidently, the
Apprendi firecracker has fizzled out at the state level just as it has at the
federal level.2 As I will argue, this welcome development shows the virtues
of federalism as a structural limit on errors. As state judges saw Apprendi's
novelty, disruption, and errors, they wisely braked and confined its scope.
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
(bibas@philo.org). B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. I originally presented
this paper at the 2003 ABA Council of Appellate Staff Attorneys' Seminar.
1 530 U.S. 466,490, 496 (2000).
2 For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has declined to extend Apprendi to its
radical but logical conclusion, see Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme
Court Balks at Extending Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 79
(2002).
STEPHANOS BIBAS
While remaining faithful to the Supreme Court's supremacy, they brought
their own wisdom to bear in limiting Apprendi. They thus avoided
compounding its errors, showing how federalism uses the practical wisdom
of many actors in a decentralized system. The state courts are far from
lock-step implementers of Supreme Court decisions or mindless bastions of
conservatism; they are truly valuable partners in our federalist system of
criminal procedure.
I. INDICTMENTS
The first area that Apprendi could have affected is the right to
indictment. Apprendi's logic (though not its holding) required federal
indictments to charge all facts that raise maximum sentences.3 This rule,
however, did not bind state courts because the Grand Jury Clause of the
Fifth Amendment has not been incorporated against the states.4 Based on
Apprendi, a few state courts have required state indictments to allege the
facts and statutory subsections supporting penalty enhancements. For
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has required prosecutors to
plead firearm enhancements in their indictments. Likewise, the Supreme
Court of Alaska has required a state indictment to allege that a burglary
took place at night in an occupied dwelling.6
More courts, however, have held that state indictments need not charge
the facts and statutory subsections that support enhancements. The
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has held that state indictments need not
charge enhancements for selling drugs near schools or housing projects.7
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that Apprendi does not require
state indictments to charge firearm enhancements. That court declined to
apply complex federal pleading practices to New Mexico's simpler
pleading system, and it expressed a preference for construing Apprendi
narrowly.8  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that a state
indictment need not give notice of a sentence enhancement for aggravated
' See 530 U.S. at 476-77 n.3.
4 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
5 State v. Lucas, 548 S.E.2d 712, 732 (N.C. 2001).
6 State v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949, 952-54 (Alaska 2002) (based on Apprendi and approving
of Donlun); Donlun v. State, 527 P.2d 472, 473-74 (Alaska 1974) (on state-law grounds).
7 Skinner v. State, 843 So. 2d 820, 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (per curiam); Poole v.
State, 846 So. 2d 370, 387-88 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that the
prosecution must give notice that it will seek to enhance a sentence for selling drugs because
the sale occurred near a school and a housing project, but that this notice need not be in the
indictment).
8 State v. Badoni, 62 P.3d 348, 351-52 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).
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battery in the course of a murder.9 Because the Grand Jury Clause does not
bind the states, the court reasoned, state prosecutors are free to notify
defendants of enhancements in other ways.' ° For instance, prosecutors can
give notice of enhancements in bills of particulars." Finally, courts in
Georgia, Oregon, and Tennessee have held that indictments need not charge
aggravating factors that trigger death sentences.
2
II. GUILTY PLEAS
Apprendi issues can also arise at guilty-plea hearings. Many
defendants who pleaded guilty before Apprendi have later tried to raise
Apprendi claims. Unfortunately for them, state courts have routinely
rejected these claims. They regularly hold that entry of a plea agreement
and guilty plea waives Apprendi claims. Their reasoning makes sense: in
bargaining away their rights to trial and confessing guilt, defendants who
plead guilty waive their rights to jury determinations beyond a reasonable
doubt. 13 The only exception to this rule is in Kansas. Kansas courts have
held the entire system of judicially administered presumptive sentencing
guidelines invalid on its face. Even a defendant's agreement to a judicial
upward departure as part of a plea bargain cannot waive this objection. 4
III. TRIALS
Apprendi also portended important changes in trial procedure. One
danger of allowing juries to find aggravating facts is possible prejudice to
their determinations of guilt. In response, some Justices in the Apprendi
majority suggested that trial courts bifurcate trials to keep juries from
learning of aggravators until after they convict of the base crime.' 5 Some
9 State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 233-34 (R.I. 2002).
10 Id.
11 See FED. R. CiM. P. 7(f) (authorizing bills of particulars).
12 Terrell v. State, 572 S.E.2d 595, 602-03 (Ga. 2002); State v. Oatney, 66 P.3d 475,485-
87 (Or. 2003); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 466-67 (Tenn. 2002).
13 Sanchez v. People, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 208 (Cal. 2002); Weeks v. State, 761 A.2d
804, 806 (Del. 2000) (per curiam); Hindenach v. State, 807 So. 2d 739, 743-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002); People v. Jackson, 769 N.E.2d 21, 26-28 (II. 2002); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d
463, 473-74 (Nev. 2002).
14 State v. Cullen, 60 P.3d 933, 937 (Kan. 2003). This ruling appears to rest on the idea
that the judge triggered the upward departure by making factual findings that apparently
were not contained in the defendant's plea allocution and plea agreement. Had the defendant
alluded to these facts, the result probably would have been different.
15 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521 n.10 (Thomas, J., concurring); Monge v. California, 524
U.S. 721, 739 n.l (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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state courts have followed this suggestion and approved bifurcated trials.
16
Furthermore, Apprendi also requires specific findings of aggravating facts,
and courts have grappled with how to ensure these findings. State courts
are split on whether Apprendi requires judges to submit special verdict
forms listing aggravating facts to juries.' 7 Where Apprendi requires juries
to find an aggravating fact (such as that a park was run by the government),
judges may not instruct juries to take judicial notice of that fact. 8
IV. SENTENCING
Apprendi's main impact, of course, has been on sentencing. State
courts have held that judges can continue to make many of the
determinations that they have traditionally made at sentencing. For
example, the courts have agreed that judges may find facts that trigger
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. They reason that because the
ultimate sentence does not exceed the combined statutory maxima, there is
no Apprendi problem.' 9 The Illinois courts briefly took a contrary stance
and held that Apprendi required juries to make the consecutive-sentence
determination, but they have since overruled that approach.2°
Another area in which judges can find facts involves sex-offender
registration. So-called Megan's Laws require convicted sex offenders to
register with the police.2' Some of these laws are triggered by a judge's
finding that an offender committed an offense with a sexual purpose.22 Is
this a factual finding that triggers a sentence enhancement and thus requires
a finding by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt? The courts that have
considered the issue have rejected this claim. They uniformly agree that
16 State v. Nichols, 33 P.3d 1172, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
17 Compare Poole v. State, 846 So. 2d 370, 388 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (per curiam)
(instructing trial courts to submit two verdict forms to juries, one of which seeks a verdict on
the base crime and the other of which seeks a verdict on the enhancement) with Kormondy v.
State, 845 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that trial courts need not submit
special verdict forms to juries for aggravating circumstances that make defendants eligible
for the death penalty).
18 State v. Harvey, 647 N.W.2d 189, 197 (Wis. 2002).
19 See Wright v. State, 46 P.3d 395, 398 (Alaska 2003); People v. Clifton, 69 P.3d 81,
82-85 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001), vacated and remanded by No. 02SC80, 2003 WL 1906360
(Colo. Apr. 21, 2003); Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 764 (Fla. 2002); People v. Harris, 784
N.E.2d 792, 798 (Il1. 2003); State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 698-99 (Iowa 2001); State v.
Bramlett, 41 P.3d 796, 798 (Kan. 2002); State v. Wilson, No. 2002-Ohio-5920, 2002 WL
31420758, at *8-*9 (Ohio App. Oct. 25, 2002).
20 People v. Clifton, 750 N.E.2d 686, 703-04 (I11. App. Ct. 2000), overruled by People v.
Wagener, 752 N.E.2d 430, 440-42 (I11. 2001).
21 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 1994).
22 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-256 (West 1999).
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sex-offender registration is a regulatory measure, not a punitive one, and so
is not within Apprendi's scope. Registration is a collateral consequence of
conviction and not punishment for an additional, aggravated crime.23 This
approach is in keeping with the Supreme Court's treatment of sex-offender
civil commitment laws as regulatory civil measures rather than punitive
criminal ones. 24  By the same reasoning, involuntary commitment of
incompetent defendants is regulatory, not punitive, and so not subject to
Apprendi.
25
In some states, conviction of a sex offense automatically triggers an
extended term of post-release supervision. Judges may impose these
extended terms, notwithstanding Apprendi, because the extensions are
automatic and do not depend on any additional findings of fact.26
Juvenile-court judges often find by a preponderance of the evidence
facts that trigger transfer to adult court, where the possible penalties are
much higher. Defendants have raised Apprendi challenges, claiming that
juries should find these facts beyond a reasonable doubt. State courts
routinely reject these challenges. They reason that determining whether a
child is amenable to juvenile-court processes requires a complex assessment
of the child's age, maturity, environment, past behavior, and likely future
behavior.2 7  This forward-looking assessment of the prospects for
rehabilitation is complex and laden with discretion, unlike the finding of
historical facts about a particular crime.28 In addition, the transfer finding is
a purely jurisdictional threshold issue, and a jury will ultimately have to
find each element beyond a reasonable doubt before sentencing.29
Apprendi carved out an exception to its rule for enhancements based
on prior convictions. 3° It preserved the holding of Almendarez-Torres,
which allowed judges to find prior convictions that trigger recidivism
23 State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1128-32 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Young v. State, 806
A.2d 233, 250 (Md. Ct. App. 2002).
24 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997).
25 State v. Spriggs-Gore, 64 P.3d 506, 513 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003).
26 State v. Walker, 60 P.3d 937 (Kan. 2003).
27 State v. Gonzales, 24 P.3d 776, 783-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 23 P.3d
929 (N.M. 2001).
28 Walker, 60 P.3d at 937.
29 In re Matthew M., 780 N.E.2d 723, 733-34 (I11. App. Ct. 2002); People v. Beltran, 765
N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); State v. Hartpence, 42 P.3d 1197, 1205 (Kan.
2002); In re Personal Restraint Petition of Massey, 115 Wash. App. 1016 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (unpublished); see also State v. D.J., No. 0003002567, 2001 WL 1671085, at *1 (Del.
Farn. Ct. May 17, 2001).
30 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-90.
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enhancements. 1 States have followed the Supreme Court's lead and
continued to allow judges to find facts that trigger recidivism
enhancements.32
Once a jury has found a fact that raises the statutory maximum
sentence, judges may weigh and determine other facts in deciding where the
sentence should fall within the new range. For example, in one case a
jury's verdict necessarily found that the victim was over the age of sixty,
which raised the statutory maximum sentence. Because the jury had
already raised the maximum by finding one aggravating factor, the judge
could consider and find other aggravating factors in deciding where to
sentence within the new range.33 A New Mexico court has allowed judges
to find facts that limit an inmate's possibility of earning good-time credit,
because these findings limit mitigation rather than aggravating sentences
beyond the statutory maximum. 34 In a similar vein, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has allowed judges to find whether a kidnapping victim had been
voluntarily released unharmed. This fact distinguishes two grades of
kidnapping that carry different punishments. Nonetheless, the court noted
that the statute makes ordinary kidnapping a class IA felony and allows
voluntary release and lack of harm to mitigate the felony down to class 11. 35
These rulings are faithful to Apprendi's clear line between aggravating and
mitigating punishment. They also highlight how arbitrary the line is. Why
should it matter whether Nebraska's kidnapping statute treats harm as an
aggravating factor or absence of harm as a mitigating factor? The
distinction is an arbitrary artifact of drafting. It also opens the door to
legislative evasion of Apprendi's strictures by simply redrafting every
aggravator as a mitigator. Nonetheless, most courts are faithfully applying
the unprincipled line between aggravating and mitigating factors, as
required by Apprendi.
The same reasoning allows judges to participate in capital sentencing.
A year and a half ago, the Supreme Court struck down capital sentencing by
judges. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court held that a jury must first raise the
maximum sentence to death by finding at least one aggravating
circumstance.36 But Ring left room for judges to participate after such a
31 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998).
32 State v. Lebaron, 808 A.2d 541, 544-45 (N.H. 2002); see also infra note 41 and
accompanying text (citing state cases that continue to allow judges to find recidivism as an
aggravating factor in capital sentencing).
33 People v. Hopkins, 773 N.E.2d 633, 640 (I11. 2002).
34 State v. Morales, 39 P.3d 747, 748 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
35 Garza v. Kenney, 646 N.W.2d 579, 582-83 (Neb. 2002).
36 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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jury finding, and most state courts have upheld this judicial participation.
For example, the process of weighing aggravating against mitigating
circumstances is not a determination of historical fact, but a moral or legal
judgment. Thus, once a jury finding has raised the maximum sentence to
death, a majority of states let judges find that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances and so warrant death.37 Likewise,
judges may find that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to
preclude the death penalty.38 The upshot is that states may give judges the
power to impose death sentences after advisory juries have made sentence
recommendations, so long as the jury has first found at least one
aggravator.39 Judges may find that defendants are not mentally retarded and
therefore eligible to die.40 And judges may decide, as a matter of law, that
certain prior convictions would count as "serious assaultive criminal
convictions," so long as the capital jury ultimately finds that the defendant
in fact had those convictions.4 1 So long as a jury finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that an aggravating factor was present, it need not agree on which
aggravator was present or which evidentiary theory proves an element.4 2
37 Ex parte Waldrop, 2002 WL 31630710, at *6-*7 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2002); Brice v. State,
815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 626-27 (Neb. 2003);
Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 565-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). Cf People v. Ballard, 794
N.E.2d 788, 819 (Ill. 2002) (holding that the state need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the mitigating circumstances are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances);
Murphy, 54 P.3d at 566 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that juries need not find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators). Arizona and Nevada courts
disagree. They have overread Ring as reserving for juries the finding and weighing of
mitigators, even though Ring's rationale is limited to the initial aggravator that raises the
maximum to death. See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 942-43 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); State v.
Pandeli, 65 P.3d 950, 952 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Johnson, 59 P.3d 450, 460-61 (Nev. 2002).
38 People v. Harris, 794 N.E.2d 181, 202 (Il. 2002).
39 Four states use advisory juries as part of their capital-sentencing process: Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209 (2003), amended by 2003 Del. Laws 174 (2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (2003); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 2003).
40 State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 860 n.35 (La. 2002); see also People v. Smith, 751
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding that prosecution does not bear the burden
of disproving the defendant's mental retardation).
41 State v. Williams, 97 S.W.2d 462, 474 (Mo. 2003). Indeed, one would expect that
judges could find all prior criminal convictions, based on Apprendi's exception for
recidivism enhancements. Ex parte Smith, 2003 WL 1145475, at *7-*8 (Ala. Mar. 14,
2003); Ring, 65 P.3d at 936-37; Bottoson v. Moore, 893 So. 2d 693, 722-23 (Fla. 2002)
(Pariente, J., concurring in result). This exception is on shaky ground, however, as Justice
Thomas has suggested that he would supply the fifth vote to abolish the recidivism
exception. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
42 People v. Snow, 65 P.3d 749, 799 n.32 (Cal. 2003) (specific aggravating factor);
People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 108 (Cal. 2001) (same); Commonwealth v. Obershaw, 762
N.E.2d 276, 289-90 (Mass. 2002) (specific "evidentiary consideration").
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A few states have found ways around Apprendi and Ring. If a jury's
verdict has already implicitly found an aggravating factor, that finding by
itself raises the statutory maximum sentence to death. There is thus no need
for a second jury finding. For example, if a jury convicts a defendant of
murder in the course of a robbery, it has necessarily found the aggravating
circumstance of robbery.4 3 States may follow up this idea by doing more to
build aggravating circumstances into the charge of conviction, obviating
jury input later. It is not clear how far this trend can go, however, as the
Supreme Court has underscored the importance of an individualized
narrowing step after the guilt phase.
44
In contrast with this long list of decisions about what judges may find,
there is a much shorter list of what they may not find. Simply put, judges
may not find facts that raise maximum sentences. They may not find
aggravating circumstances that trigger the death penalty45 (with the possible
exception of prior convictions, as noted above). Thus, in addition to the
Arizona law invalidated in Ring and Nevada's provision allowing judges to
break jury deadlocks, Colorado, Idaho, and Nebraska courts have struck
down their judicial capital sentencing schemes.4 6 Montana should follow
suit, as it too allows judges to impose death sentences without jury
authorization.47  Judges may not find that an arson was aggravated rather
than simple, as that fact raises the maximum sentence.48 Judges may not
take judicial notice that a park was run by the government in order to trigger
an enhancement for selling drugs near a government-run park.49 They may
not enhance sentences for gang-related crimes, as this infringes on the
jury's prerogative to find whether the crime was gang-related. °
43 Stallworth v. State, No. 98-0366, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 21 at *6 (Ala. Crim.
App. Jan. 31, 2003), cert. denied, Exparte Stallworth, No. 1020941, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 210
(Ala. June 27, 2003).
44 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (striking down a state
statute that mandated the death penalty for all first-degree murders because it did not leave
enough room to consider the character and circumstances of the individual defendant).
45 State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 622-24 (Neb. 2003).
46 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 263 (Colo.
2003); State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho 2002); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 624
(Neb. 2003); Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 458 (Nev. 2002). Several of these states have
since rewritten their capital-sentencing laws to give juries greater roles. Amiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703.01 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201 (West 2003); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-2519 to -2521 (2003).
47 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2003).
48 State v. Palermo, 818 So. 2d 745, 752-53 (La. 2002).
49 State v. Harvey, 647 N.W.2d 189, 196-97 (Wis. 2002).
SO State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 196 (Utah 1999).
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Very few decisions have expanded Apprendi's ambit beyond facts that
raise statutory maximum sentences. Kansas, for example, has a sentencing-
guidelines system that sets forth presumptive sentences for certain crimes
but allows judges to depart up or down upon finding certain facts.
Prosecutors have argued that Apprendi applies only to the maxima set by
Kansas's statutes and not its sentencing guidelines. Kansas courts have
rejected this argument, holding that because findings of facts are
prerequisites for heavier sentences, juries must find these facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.51
California, though recognizing that Apprendi applies only to facts that
raise statutory maxima, has interpreted its own statutes to impose broader
requirements. The California Supreme Court has held that state law
requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that
trigger sentence enhancements, even if these enhancements do not raise
52statutory maxima.
The other extension of Apprendi has come in New Jersey. Under New
Jersey's No Early Release Act, convicted defendants must serve at least
eighty-five percent of their sentences if a sentencing hearing determines that
their crimes were violent. The statute does not specify who should find
these facts, so some judges found them at sentencing. The New Jersey
Supreme Court found that Apprendi casts serious constitutional doubt on
whether judges could find facts that trigger minimum sentences. Thus, the
court construed the statute to require juries to find these facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.5 3
These state courts adopted these expansive readings while it was still
unclear whether Apprendi might reach sentencing guidelines or mandatory
minima. In other words, these readings look like mistaken predictions of
where the Supreme Court was going as opposed to efforts to innovate.
Since then, however, the Supreme Court has decided United States v.
Harris,54 which held that judges can find facts that trigger statutory
mandatory minima. Harris also implicitly held that judges can find facts
that raise sentencing guidelines ranges, as the fact at issue in Harris raised
Harris's guidelines sentence by two years. 55 I suspect that in the wake of
Harris, other courts are unlikely to follow these states' leads.
51 State v. Cullen, 60 P.3d 933, 937 (Kan. 2003); State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan.
2001).
52 People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 745-47 (Cal. 2001).
53 State v. Johnson, 766 A.2d 1126, 1138 (N.J. 2001).
14 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
55 See Bibas, supra note 2, at 81. The Supreme Court, however, has recently granted
certiorari in a case that will revisit whether Apprendi applies to facts that result in upward
2003]
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V. APPEAL AND HABEAS
Though many defendants have raised Apprendi claims after
conviction, few have been successful. The two biggest hurdles to raising
Apprendi claims are the doctrines of retroactivity and harmless error. Most
courts that have addressed the issue have held that Apprendi is not
retroactive on collateral review. They reason that Apprendi is not a
watershed rule that seriously affects the fairness of a trial.16 This logic is
questionable, since Apprendi extends the fundamental safeguard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to new elements of crimes.57 Nonetheless, only
Texas applies Apprendi retroactively to cases on collateral review, though
Texas courts have done so without analyzing the retroactivity issue. 5'
Harmless-error analysis also precludes many defendants from
receiving relief under Apprendi. One might have thought that the identity
of the factfinder and the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement
were structural errors not susceptible to harmless-error review.
departures under state sentencing guidelines but do not raise statutory maxima. Blakely v.
Washington, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Oct.
20, 2003) (No. 02-1632).
56 See Sanders v. State, 815 So. 2d 590, 592 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Sepulveda,
32 P.3d 1085, 1087-88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Hughes v. State, 826 So. 2d 1070, 1073-75
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (applying a balancing-test approach to retroactivity and
concluding that Apprendi is not retroactive because it is not essential to preventing
individual miscarriages of justice, it curbs traditional judicial fact-finding at sentencing, and
retroactivity would unleash a wave of post-conviction claims); People v. Scullark, 759
N.E.2d 565, 581 (I11. 2001); State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001); State v. Tallard,
816 A.2d 977, 981 (N.H. 2003); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 473 (Nev. 2002); Teague v.
Palmateer, 57 P.3d 176, 184-86 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (reasoning that because Apprendi is
subject to harmless-error and plain-error analysis, it cannot be a watershed rule);
Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 812 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. 2002) (refusing to apply Apprendi
retroactively because the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet made it
retroactive); Greenup v. State, 2002 WL 31246136 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 02, 2002); see
also McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1257 (1 1th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss,
252 F.3d 993, 1003 (8th Cir. 2001); Dukes v. United States, 255 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2001); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d
1227, 1239 (9th Cir. 2000).
57 A few judges have recognized this point. See Moss, 252 F.3d at 1003 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting) (finding Apprendi retroactive under Teague v. Lane doctrine); United States v.
Clark, 260 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., dissenting from remand for
reconsideration) (same); United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (D. Minn.
2000); Darity v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 2d 355, 367 (W.D.N.C. 2000); see also
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing Apprendi as a "watershed
change in constitutional law").
58 Ex parte Boyd, 58 S.W.3d 134, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (not discussing the
retroactivity issue).
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Nonetheless, every state court to consider the issue has held that Apprendi
errors can be, and in many cases are, harmless.5 9
Finally, procedural bars foreclose many Apprendi claims. If a
defendant waives an Apprendi claim, for example by asking a judge to
determine a fact to avoid prejudice, he cannot on appeal invoke his right to
60a jury determination. One Texas court, however, has treated the newness
of the Apprendi rule as a justification for failing to raise the claim at trial.6'
VI. THE MORAL OF THE STORY
What lessons can we draw from this experience in the states? The
state courts appear to be following the Supreme Court almost in lock-step.
One might doubt state courts as a source of variety, creativity, and
experimentation, viewing them instead as merely ministerial implementers
of the Supreme Court's dictates.
This interpretation strikes me as uncharitable, however. Plenty of state
courts have experimented with creative criminal procedure doctrines
broader than the federal minima. Nor are they always hostile to criminal
defendants. State discovery rules, for example, often go far beyond federal
requirements. Rather, I think the states are reading Apprendi narrowly
because of several features of that case.
The first observation is that Apprendi is novel. It breaks sharply with
two centuries of judicial discretion at sentencing. Apprendi tries to recreate
an eighteenth-century vision of jury supremacy, but it does so in a way that
is sharply discontinuous from what went before. Innate conservatism may
constrain some state courts more than it does the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The second reason is that Apprendi is disruptive. It upsets settled
practices at many stages of criminal proceedings, from indictments to pleas
to trials to sentencing. It challenges the identity of the factfinder and the
standard of proof. If taken to an extreme, this principle could have upset
every case in which a judge sentenced a defendant to more than the bare
minimum sentence. The cost of reopening and retrying or resentencing
hundreds of thousands of cases would have been staggering. Practical-
59 People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 745-48 (Cal. 2001); State v. Davis, 772 A.2d
559, 567-68 (Conn. 2001); People v. Thurow, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1030 (Ill. 2003); State v.
Burdick, 782 A.2d 319, 329 (Me. 2001); Clark v. State, 621 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (N.D.
2001); Palmateer, 57 P.3d at 185; see also Sanders, 247 F.3d at 150; United States v.
Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829
(I I th Cir. 2000).
60 Abrego v. State, 38 P.3d 868, 871-72 (Nev. 2002).
61 Exparte Boyd, 58 S.W.3d at 136.
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minded state judges, who would hear many more of these challenges, were
understandably reluctant to broaden this new rule.
The third reason is that Apprendi is wrong. As I have argued
elsewhere, Apprendi's abstract principle undervalues the benefits of
insulated, expert judicial sentencing. It disrupts procedures that worked
well to reduce bias and ensure equality in favor of untested jury sentencing.
And by fragmenting crimes, it gives prosecutors more power to manipulate
indictments and plea bargain, while hobbling judges' power to check
prosecutors at the sentencing stage.62 State courts, which rarely speak with
one yoice, have united to interpret Apprendi narrowly because they agree
that it was a mistake. This consensus is a powerful indictment of
Apprendi's correctness. The state courts would probably undo Apprendi if
they could, but because Apprendi ratchets up the federal minimum, the most
that they can do is to interpret it narrowly.
If one takes this perspective, the state courts appear much wiser.
Apprendi was decided by a bare majority of five Justices, most of whom
lacked significant experience in criminal law.63 State judges often have
more experience and are more sensitive to how abstract doctrine will fare in
the real world. Thus, state courts have buffered this mistaken innovation by
construing it narrowly and cautiously to minimize disruption and harmonize
Apprendi with existing law and sentencing practice. Fans of federalism
often praise states as laboratories of experimentation, but the process here
worked in reverse: decentralized implementation allowed states to cushion
the blow and reduce the damage inflicted by a central mistake. Practical
concerns that are more visible to lower-level judges wisely temper
Apprendi's theoretical principle and hem in its unintended consequences.
The state courts have been faithful to Apprendi's central rule, but they have
been careful not to compound its error.
Apprendi, then, is an example of how the system's self-correcting
mechanisms worked as damage control. State judges remain important as
62 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in
a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001).
63 Though Justice Stevens practiced law for two decades in addition to teaching, Justices
Ginsburg and Scalia spent most of their careers as academics and on the bench, and Justices
Thomas and Souter worked in government. None of them had significant experience
prosecuting or defending criminal cases. In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist spent sixteen
years in private practice, Justice Kennedy spent fourteen years in private practice, Justice
O'Connor served as a deputy county attorney and in private practice as well as in a state
legislature, and Justice Breyer was deeply involved in creating the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. See LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, U.S. SUPREME COURT 2001, at
http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/fullcourt.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2003)
(containing links to the Justices' biographies).
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much for what they refrain from doing as for what they do, and the brakes
on runaway action are as valuable as the spurs to reform.
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